

Adjudicating the Debate Over Two Models of Nature Appreciation

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It seems commonplace to point out that we aesthetically appreciate a wide variety of objects: that is, art objects are not the only good candidates for aesthetic appreciation.¹ We know from experience that one can aesthetically appreciate not only Georgia O'Keefe's *White Trumpet Flower*, but also a white trumpet flower. Similarly, we can aesthetically appreciate both a pictorial representation of the human form and that form instantiated in certain prime specimens. We do so, moreover, without classifying either flowers or human beings as art objects. Yet, the paradigm of aesthetic appreciation today, in both everyday life and in educative contexts, is the appreciation of art, which explains why we tend to try to understand what makes aesthetic appreciation appropriate in terms of what makes art appreciation appropriate. This approach may not be entirely mistaken, for beginning with the familiar is always a good plan. However, it must be done with care, otherwise important differences between our relationships with the art we appreciate and with the nature we appreciate may be overlooked, thereby obscuring salient differences in the appreciation of each.

In this essay, I focus on the issue of the appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature and offer an overview of a contemporary debate on the topic. I begin with a general discussion of art and nature appreciation. I then summarize Kendall Walton's theory of appropriate art appreciation and explain his skepticism regarding the possibility of appropriate and inappropriate nature appreciation. Next, I discuss two models according to which Walton is mistaken, as the philosophers who present these models, Allen Carlson and Noël Carroll, do so to illustrate how nature appreciation can be properly considered appropriate or inappropriate. It may seem that given the recent proliferation of models of nature appreciation, the last thing we should seek is yet another model. However, in the end, I shall argue the need for a new and different kind of model, one that is a revisionist and extensionist model of nature appreciation.

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Art and Nature Appreciation

Concerning the perceptual activity of the audience, how we ought to appreciate artworks is largely uncontroversial. Perhaps this is why Carlson opens his attempt to understand the aesthetic appreciation of nature with a presentation of the aesthetic appreciation of art, explaining that “with art objects there is a straightforward sense in which we know both what and how to aesthetically appreciate.”² Although not all artworks offer “straightforward” examples of aesthetic appreciation, Carlson’s general point is reasonably motivated. As Kendall Walton succinctly explains: “Paintings and sculptures are to be looked at; sonatas and songs are to be heard. What is important about these works of art, as works of art, is what can be seen or heard in them.”³ That we ought to look at paintings and listen to sonatas seems obvious for at least two reasons. First, via formal education and informal interactions, we have grown familiar with the conventions of art appreciation; second, such conventions find experiential reinforcement when, for example, our auditory sense is tickled by a Mozart concerto.⁴

Underlying our relative lack of confidence when it comes to nature appreciation is the obvious fact that nature, unlike art, is not an artifact. Nature was not made by beings like us; it was made neither for our use, nor for our entertainment, nor for our appreciation.⁵ As Carlson puts it, “art objects are our own creations; it is for this reason that we know what is and what is not part of a work, which of its aspects are of aesthetic significance, and how to appreciate them” (*ANE*, 41). We need, therefore, a model of nature appreciation that will serve as a source of education regarding how best to appreciate nature and will offer the confidence we lack and the guidance we seek.

It might seem that we should simply apply our knowledge of art to nature appreciation — that is, appreciate nature as if it were art. However, as numerous philosophers have noticed, this approach is mistaken.⁶ The mistake is both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, it is a category error, for nature is not art. Practically, this category error has some regrettable effects. As Ronald Hepburn points out, to try to appreciate nature as if it were a work of art is to “look — and of course look in vain — for what can be found and enjoyed only in art.”⁷ We cannot find all of the features that we enjoy in artworks in nature; the originality, self-deprecating humor, or ease of execution of various artworks are features that are simply not present in nature.

Furthermore, appreciating nature as if it were art is an error with negative aesthetic implications. Carlson calls the error an “appreciative pity,” because by appreciating nature as art we either fail to appreciate nature at all or we appreciate it in an inappropriate, usually feeble manner. Carlson offers the example of a rock taken from its environment and brought into someone’s home:

On the mantel it may seem wonderfully smooth and gracefully curved and expressive of solidity, but in its environment of creation it will have more and different aesthetic qualities — qualities that are the product of the relationship between it and its environment. It is here expressive of the particular forces that shaped and continue to shape it and displays for aesthetic appreciation its place in and relation to the environment. Moreover, depending upon its place in that environment it may not express many of those qualities, for example, solidity — that it appears to express when on the mantle (*ANE*, 44).

Nature appreciation must be object specific. This, however, is not to suggest that generally speaking our appreciation of both nature and art are of the same form. As Malcolm Budd explains:

The fact that the aesthetics of nature is the aesthetics of *nature* is compatible with the view that there is a unitary notion of aesthetic appreciation according to which aesthetic appreciation abstracts from the kind of thing the object of appreciation is, focusing only on an item's sensible properties and how they are structured to compose the item's perceptual form.⁸

Nature is not art, and therefore should not be appreciated as if it were. To appreciate nature as if it were art is to neglect to pay attention to at least some of the unique properties of natural objects and perhaps to attribute artistic features to nature that nature simply cannot possess. Instead, we must appreciate nature *as nature*. The question, however, remains: how should we appreciate nature so as to ensure that we are appreciating it *as nature*?

Appreciating Art Appropriately

In “Categories of Art,” Walton argues that an artwork's aesthetic properties depend on the category the work belongs to and on which of the work's non-aesthetic perceptual properties are standard, variable, and contrastandard for that category. A property is standard for a category if it counts toward an object's belonging to that category; a property is variable for a category if it is irrelevant to the object's membership in the category; and, a property is contrastandard for a category if it counts against an object belonging to a certain category. Notice that each of these categories consist of subcategories for which the classification of their features may differ. For instance, developed mammary glands are standard for women, contrastandard for men, and variable for human beings.

Walton does not attempt to outline the precise ways in which the absence or presence of standard, variable, and contrastandard features affects our perception of the object and resultant aesthetic appreciation of it. It would likely be impossible to do so, and not obviously worthwhile. In some cases, the presence of a contrastandard feature adds to the aesthetic value of an artwork, while in others the presence of a contrastandard feature de-

tracts from the work's value. For example, Steven Spielberg's use of black-and-white cinematography in a *Schindler's List* (re)introduced audiences to a contrastandard (formerly standard) feature with dramatic effect. However, the colorization of films such as *Casablanca* was largely unsuccessful as audiences failed to appreciate the added color, which was seen as unnatural and tinny. Whether and how the standard, variable and contrastandard features of an artwork contribute to or detract from the work's aesthetic value depends on additional features, including, especially, the overall execution of the work. It suffices to say that what we know and learn about a work's nonaesthetic features does affect our aesthetic appreciation of an object, first by helping us classify an object and then by defining a range of reasonable expectations regarding the object.

According to Walton, "the aesthetic properties [an artwork] actually has are those that are found in it when it is perceived correctly" (CA, 412). We properly appreciate an artwork when we notice and contemplate its actual aesthetic properties. Therefore, aesthetic appreciation of art is appropriate only if we view the art object under a category to which it actually belongs.⁹ Consider the following example (based on a true story). Imagine a friend expresses a negative opinion regarding the Coen brothers' film *O Brother, Where Art Thou?* She justifies her opinion on the grounds that the plot is unrealistic and the characters too fantastic. Surely she is failing to properly appreciate the work. *O Brother, Where Art Thou?* is the sort of film that is *supposed to be* unrealistic and fantastic. Your friend is looking at the film in the wrong way, and, although she may not enjoy unrealistic stories, the fact that the film is unrealistic does not justify the claim that it is not aesthetically good. *O Brother, Where Art Thou?* is a modern parodic picaresque based on Homer's *Odyssey*; hence, bizarre characters and strange twists of fate are standard for it. The film does not fail; your friend failed by expecting realism where it is contrastandard.

Works of art can be seen in more than one category without making aesthetic mistakes. For instance, Monet's *Water Lilies* are properly categorized as paintings, murals, and Impressionist Paintings. Therefore, one could properly appreciate *Water Lilies* under any of these categories. Notice that these categories are not mutually exclusive and the appreciator is therefore not compelled to choose between them when viewing *Water Lilies*. In cases such as this, Walton recommends the viewer choose the category in which the work is seen at its best aesthetically. There are also examples of artifacts that are not easily classified. These are cases where more than one possible category seems to fit the object *and* we know neither how the artist intended it to be classified nor how the artworld would tend to classify it. In cases such as these, Walton argues there is simply no correct category and therefore no way to determine the object's actual aesthetic properties. Instead, we can

attribute aesthetic properties to the object relative to the category under which we *choose* to perceive it. Walton has this to say about such a case:

If we are confronted by a work about whose origins we know absolutely nothing (for example, one lifted from the dust at an as yet unexcavated archeological site on Mars), we would simply not be in a position to judge it aesthetically... We could attribute aesthetic properties to it in the way we do natural objects, which of course does not involve consideration of historical facts about artists or their societies (CA, 412).

In such cases, Walton's theory suggests that only a category-relative judgment can be made.

To his argument that art appreciation is appropriate when the art object is viewed under the proper category, Walton adds the caveat "that aesthetic judgments are in *some* contexts amenable to such category-relative interpretations, especially aesthetic judgments about natural objects (clouds, mountains, sunsets) rather than works of art" (CA, 394).¹⁰ Whereas artworks tend to have determinately correct categories, the categories of natural objects are open to interpretation. We can only assign categories to nature, thereby attributing the aesthetic properties that are a function of those categories to them. For example, a cloud looked at as a puff of smoke in the sky is whimsical and gentle, but looked at as resembling a great polar bear it is dominating and strong. Although these sets of judgments seem contradictory, they are not because each is relative to a different category. Hence, it seems to follow that there are no, or at least comparatively few, inappropriate ways to appreciate nature, where there clearly are for art.¹¹

Recall the question posed at the close of the previous section: *How should we appreciate nature as nature?* We are seeking guidance about how best to appreciate nature aesthetically and the answer we have arrived at by considering Walton's theory appears to be *however you decide to or happen to*. If so, then not only is it a mistake to appreciate nature *as if* it were art, but appreciating nature *as* we appreciate art is seemingly not possible.

The Role of Science in Appreciating Nature Appropriately

Many thinkers are unsatisfied with Walton's account of nature appreciation.¹² Carlson is perhaps the most vocal of these. He assesses Walton's theory of nature appreciation as follows:

The position has an initial implausibility that leads one to ask why Walton and any other aestheticians accept it. Its implausibility can be seen by noting that not only do many aesthetic judgments about nature strike us as clearly true (e.g., "The Grand Tetons are majestic") or clearly false (e.g., "The Grand Tetons are dumpy"), but also that many of such judgments seem to be paradigmatic aesthetic judgments

— ones in virtue of which we initially grasp aesthetic judgments (e.g., graceful gazelle, majestic mountain, sublime sunset).¹³

We see here a modern version of the paradox Hume confronts in his *Of the Standard of Taste*. It might seem as if “beauty is in the eye of the beholder,” yet simple common sense tells us that some aesthetic judgments are plain wrong: “Whoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance between Ogilby and Milton...would be thought to defend no less an extravagance, than if he maintained a mole-hill to be as high as Teneriffe.”¹⁴ Similarly, although Walton argues that aesthetic judgments about nature are not objective, some aesthetic judgments of nature strike us as obviously true or false: clearly, the Grand Tetons are not dumpy.

Moreover, Carlson argues that in many cases aesthetic appreciation of nature instructs aesthetic appreciation in general, even of the aesthetic appreciation of art. It is no surprise then that students of art are frequently instructed to observe the beauty in nature for inspiration and to learn how aesthetic value looks, sounds, and feels. We can learn what gracefulness looks like, for example, by observing a leaping gazelle. If art appreciation is objective and aesthetic judgments about art have truth values, and if much art appreciation is informed by nature appreciation, why does the notion of objectivity function in such a radically different manner in nature appreciation? Carlson argues the appreciation of art and nature are not so different, and offers an account that secures objectivity for aesthetic judgments of nature and art.

Carlson argues that “human production is not the only key to correctness of category. In general we do not produce, but rather discover, natural objects and aspects of nature. Why should we therefore not discover the correct categories for their perception?”¹⁵ There are such discoverable categories of nature, and they are familiar to all of us: the categories supplied by the natural sciences. Thus, while in art appreciation the “grounds for correctness are the activities of artists and art critics,” in nature appreciation the grounds for correctness are “the activities of the naturalists and scientists.”¹⁶

Yet, simply knowing the correct categories is not sufficient for appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature. Such knowledge must be insufficient, otherwise every scientific experiment, discovery, or analysis of nature would be a case of appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature. However, a medical examiner performing an autopsy and a scientist dissecting an animal know the correct categories of nature and how the objects of their studies — and their parts — fit into them. Yet neither is doing anything I would wish to call aesthetically appreciating nature, let alone appropriately doing so.¹⁷ There must be more to aesthetic appreciation than scientific knowledge.

In looking for further directives, Carlson considers two paradigmatic models of art appreciation that seem straightforwardly applicable to nature appreciation. These are the object model and the landscape model. According

to the object model, one legitimate way to appreciate nature is to appreciate it as we appreciate nonrepresentational works of art. Carlson explains the edicts of this model: "We may appreciate a rock or a piece of driftwood in the same way as we appreciate a Brancusi sculpture: we actually or contemplatively remove the object from its surroundings and dwell on its sensuous and design qualities and its possible expressive qualities" (*ANE*, 43). Just as nonrepresentational works of art, for example, Brancusi's *Sleeping Muse* or *Bird in Space*, natural objects do not refer beyond themselves but rather call on us to reflect on their appearance alone. There is much to be said in favor of the object model. Most notably, the object model accords with our experience: we do collect natural objects; for example, pebbles, seashells, and driftwood — and display them in our homes as pieces of found art. According to this model of nature appreciation, the objects of nature appreciation are natural objects with sensuous, design, and expressive features, and we ought to appreciate them in the same way we appreciate nonrepresentational works of art.

Initially it seems as if this model does not conflate nature with art. On this model, we are directed to appreciate nature not as if it were art, but in the same way we appreciate some art objects. However, Carlson argues that a dilemma confronts the object model. In appreciating the natural object, we can either physically remove the object or leave it where we find it. If we remove the conch shell from the surf, it loses the aesthetic qualities it possesses in virtue of its relation to the environment in which we find it. This is particularly unfortunate because the aesthetic value of a natural object is at least partially constituted by such relations. Natural objects, unlike nonrepresentational works of art, are in fact not self-contained "aesthetic units."¹⁸ Rather, they "possess...an organic unity with their environments of creation: such objects are part of and have developed out of the elements in their environments by means of the forces at work within those environments" (*ANE*, 44). The aesthetic properties of a natural object are altered and diminished by removing it from its natural setting.

This is true whether we remove the object physically or conceptually. If we leave the conch shell beneath the white foam of the breakers and attempt to focus our attention on the object and therefore imaginatively abstract it from its environment, we are confronted with two problems. The first is as above: the aesthetic properties the object has in virtue of its relationship with the natural environment will be lost or altered. Second, there is the problem of framing the object. It is unclear what is and what is not a relevant part of the object of appreciation. For instance, should we abstract the conch shell out from under the foamy surf in appreciating it? Or, should we appreciate it as it is under the white water? If the water is a relevant part of the object, is the sand? And the nearby mussel shells? What about the seagulls casing the shells? The problem of framing calls our attention to the

failure of the object model to elucidate for us what to appreciate when we appreciate nature; it fails, therefore, as a source of the aesthetic education for which we seek.

The second option Carlson discusses is the landscape model. The artistic analogue to appreciable nature on this model is the landscape painting. We are also familiar with this sort of nature appreciation: think of scenic overlooks, walking tours, and picture postcards. To the question of what and how to appreciate nature this model offers an answer: appreciate picturesque nature as a scene. The landscape model advises us to view nature from a certain ideal distance (such as those prescribed by scenic overlooks) and teaches us what to value in nature: namely the picturesque and the scenic.

This model accurately describes a common mode of nature appreciation, but there are two problems with it. First, it is aesthetically suspect. It emphasizes artistic values and considers the expectation that nature conform to art justified. The landscape model thus puts us in the habit of "the sightseer" who, as Walker Percy describes:

measures his satisfaction by the degree to which the [Grand] canyon conforms to the preformed complex. If it does, if it looks like the postcard, he is pleased; he might even say, "Why it is every bit as beautiful as a picture postcard!" He feels he has not been cheated. But if it does not conform, if the colors are somber, he will not be able to see it directly; he will only be conscious of the disparity between what it is and what it is supposed to be.¹⁹

What an unsatisfied sightseer fails to do, of course, is to perceive the Grand Canyon itself in all its richness. The sightseer's experience is, so to speak, flattened; as a result, even if satisfied, the sightseer will be missing out. This model diminishes our aesthetic experience of nature by asking us to appreciate nature as something it is not: "It requires the reduction of the environment to a scene or a view (*ANE*, 47).

Moreover, the landscape model is problematic since support for the protection of the natural environment is frequently won on aesthetic grounds. The landscape model aesthetically privileges the picturesque in nature. Hence, a twofold negative effect could follow. First, we might tend to dismiss the nature that does not look "like a picture postcard" without ever giving it a chance, despite the fact that much of the natural environment in need of protection does not look like a postcard of a prairie, wetland, or peatland. If we do not expect such natural settings to be picturesque in the traditional sense, we are open to finding their unique aesthetic value; working on the landscape model, however, their aesthetic value will be overlooked.

Second, the landscape model promotes the skewed view that art depicting natural scenes is interchangeable with and perhaps even superior to the actual nature depicted. If this view seems unlikely, consider Sharon

Butala's description of her former self, before she "recovered her powerful connection with Nature:"

By the time I was twenty I had developed contempt for those who wanted to return to Nature, believing they were romantic dreamers, nitwits from the city....I liked to look at Impressionist paintings of Nature, having once harbored the dream of becoming a painter, and I was not adverse to sunsets or moonlight on water, but I was just as happy to look at pictures of them while seated on a soft couch, with my feet on a thick rug and a well-insulated wall between me and the thing itself.²⁰

Butala's confession has a familiar ring to it. To prefer the representation of nature to nature itself is not even a mildly uncommon sentiment. At best, this manner of nature appreciation can ensure the protection of a picturesque rainforest, while failing to protect the less picturesque prairie, even in cases where the less picturesque is in dire need of protection. It may also promote the idea that nature is disposable by obscuring nature's unique aesthetic value.

Thus, the object and the landscape models of nature appreciation, models that attempt to apply paradigmatic modes of art appreciation to nature appreciation, disappoint. Yet, the particular ways in which they disappoint are informative. The object model ignores the fact that natural objects are part and parcel of their natural environments. The landscape model oversimplifies nature by ignoring nature's vast sensual complexity. Learning from the mistakes of these models, Carlson presents a new model of nature appreciation and emphasizes two important and obvious aspects of the natural environment: it is natural and it is an environment.

Following a suggestion made by Francis Sparshott, Carlson begins by construing the relationship between appreciator and appreciated in nature appreciation as one that obtains between self and setting rather than between subject and object.²¹ In appreciation of the natural environment, the appreciator — the self — appreciates from within the object of appreciation — the setting. Carlson describes this process as follows:

We must experience our background setting in all those ways in which we normally experience it, by sight, smell, touch, and whatever. However, we must experience it not as unobtrusive background, but as obtrusive foreground...We cannot appreciate everything; there must be limits and emphases in our aesthetic appreciation of nature as there are in art (*ANE*, 48-49).

Since the object of appreciation is that which we regularly fail to take careful notice of — the unobtrusive background — we are confronted with the problem of indefiniteness. Dealing with art, we know where the object of appreciation begins and ends: the frame of a painting indicates its end, the

curtain falls at the close of a play, and we realize an audience member's sneeze is not part of a musical performance (unless, that is, you are at a performance of John Cage's 4'33"). Our knowledge of how to appreciate various works of art is informed by our knowledge of the categories and history of art.

However, when appreciating the natural environment, there seems no obvious place to focus our attention, precisely because there seems no clear beginning or end to a natural environment. Carlson points out that just as our knowledge of art and art history guides our appreciation of art, our common sense/scientific knowledge guides us in nature appreciation. Such knowledge, according to Carlson, "transforms raw experience by making it determinate, harmonious, and meaningful;" he explains:

In order for there to be aesthetic appreciation we must recognize the smell of hay and that of the horse dung and perhaps distinguish between them; we must feel the ant at least as an insect rather than as, say, a twitch. Such recognizing and distinguishing results in certain aspects of the obtrusive foreground becoming foci of aesthetic significance. Moreover, they are natural foci appropriate to the particular environment we are appreciating. Likewise, our knowledge of the environment may yield certain appropriate boundaries and limits to the experience. For example...the sound of cicadas may be appreciated as a proper part of the setting while the sound of the distant traffic is excluded much as we ignore the coughing in the concert hall (*ANE*, 50).

We see that appropriate nature appreciation is necessarily informed by our knowledge of nature and such knowledge informs it both by identifying points of interest and by defining suitable boundaries. The potentially overwhelming sensory stimuli of the natural environment are thereby tempered by our common sense/scientific knowledge of the environment.

In Walton's phraseology, the aesthetic properties a natural environment actually has are those that are found in it when it is perceived correctly. According to Carlson, a natural environment is perceived correctly when we allow our common sense/scientific knowledge of nature to guide our attention and inform our perceptions of the natural environment. If so, then Walton is wrong to claim that nature appreciation is merely a relative or subjective enterprise. To our recurring question: *how should we appreciate nature as nature?* Carlson responds: "To aesthetically appreciate an environment we experience our surroundings as obtrusive foreground, allowing our knowledge of that environment to select certain foci of aesthetic significance and perhaps include others, thereby limiting the experience" (*ANE*, 50). Appropriate appreciation of nature, on Carlson's model, therefore, is not the appreciation of nature *as if* it were art. It is, however, like the appreciation of art, since aesthetic judgments of nature are objectively true or false in a way analogous to aesthetic judgments of art.

The Role of Emotion in Appropriate Nature Appreciation

Carlson's model seems to tell us much about nature appreciation — the how and the what of it. Moreover, it secures objectivity for nature appreciation by explaining which cases of appreciation are appropriate. However, to many, Carlson's model seems too demanding and overly exclusionary.²² At worst, it makes appropriately aesthetically appreciating nature impossible for children and the (relatively) scientifically uninformed; at best, it seems to make the natural scientist the paradigmatic nature appreciator. Neither of these claims is *prima facie* intuitively compelling. In a characteristically succinct manner, Ludwig Wittgenstein, speaking of aesthetic appreciation, points to the area in need of further inquiry when he confesses: "I know exactly what happens when a person who knows a lot about suits goes to the tailor, also I know what happens when a person who knows nothing about suits goes."²³ The area in need of clarification is located in the space between the appreciation of the expert and that of the wholly ignorant.²⁴

Noël Carroll argues against Carlson's claim that scientific knowledge is necessary for the appropriate appreciation of nature.²⁵ Carroll does not object to Carlson's natural environment model on the grounds that Carlson's model endorses inappropriate appreciation;²⁶ they agree on the appropriateness of the nature appreciation sanctioned by Carlson's model. Rather, Carroll presents his model, the arousal model, as an alternative to Carlson's, not a replacement. Carroll is, as he says, "for co-existence" of the two (and possibly other) models (*MBN*, 246). Regarding his hesitancy to endorse Carlson's model as *the* model of appropriate nature appreciation, Carroll has this to say: "My major worry about Carlson's stance is that it excludes certain very common appreciative responses to nature — responses of a less intellectual, more visceral sort, which we might refer to as 'being moved by nature'" (*MBN*, 245).

Carroll questions whether the list of models of nature appreciation Carlson considers is complete. Carroll suggests a model to add to the list and argues that it — the arousal model — succeeds where the object and landscape models fail. Furthermore, Carroll argues that on the arousal model one can appreciate nature in an aesthetically appropriate manner in the absence of common sense/scientific knowledge. If so, then, contrary to Carlson, such knowledge is not necessary for appropriate nature appreciation and Carroll's arousal model ought to be acknowledged as an additional model of the appropriate appreciation of nature. In other words, Carlson's argument secures only the conclusion that the natural environment model describes *an* appropriate way to appreciate nature, not that it describes *the* appropriate way to appreciate nature.

According to the arousal model, we can and frequently do appropriately appreciate nature by being emotionally moved, or aroused, by the natural

setting in which we find ourselves. For example, “we may,” Carroll tells us, “find ourselves standing under a thundering waterfall and be excited by its grandeur; or standing barefooted amidst a silent arbor, softly carpeted with layers of decaying leaves, a sense of repose and homeyness may be aroused in us (*MBN*, 251). Carroll maintains that such instances are legitimate and respectable responses to nature and constitute an appropriate form of nature appreciation. To verify this claim, we must consider his model in light of the objections waged against the object and landscape models.

First, in cases such as Carroll describes, there is no temptation to remove the object of appreciation from its natural context; in fact, doing so will almost always be impossible (one cannot take a waterfall home). Hence, the arousal model does not convert nature into art, as the object model sometimes does. Second, whereas the object model is undone by the problem of frames, the arousal model can deal with it in certain cases. Carroll explains:

Certain natural expanses have natural frames or what I prefer to call natural closure: caves, copses, grottoes, clearings, arbors, valleys, etc. And other natural expanses, though lacking in frames, have features that are naturally salient for human beings — i.e., they have features such as moving water, bright illumination, etc. that draw our attention instinctually toward them (*MBN*, 251).

Thus, in cases where we are emotionally moved by nature, either the natural environment provides its own frames or the appreciator selects points of interest and features to focus on during the experience.

In cases where the natural environment comes equipped with its own frame, there is obviously no problem framing the object in an appropriate manner. In cases where it is necessary to select appropriate points of interest and boundaries, there are several ways to make such a selection. We might do as Carlson recommends and use scientific knowledge about the environment under consideration in order to decide which aspects of the environment deserve the most attention and what sort of attention they deserve. If this is the route taken on the way to being moved by nature, however, the appreciation is merely a special case of the natural environment mode of nature appreciation.²⁷ Another way to make the selection is to consciously pick those features that fit our preformed (cultural or personal) conception of how nature ought to look. Yet, this selection method is also unacceptable, for it would merely reduce the arousal model to a slightly modified version of the landscape model. However, Carroll presents a method of selection that does not in any way assimilate nature to art, but rather constitutes a natural selection process of its own.

Carroll points out that there are aspects of the natural environment that are “naturally salient” and likewise emotional responses to sensory stimuli that are quite natural; that is, “some emotional responses are bred in the

bone" (*MBN*, 251-52). With this in mind, consider the following narrative describing a highly valued experience in nature:

a favorite memory as a child is ice skating at a park pond at night. Trees encircled most of the large pond; there was an island in one part that stood as a quiet mystery. Gliding along in the cold windy dark, (this is Wisconsin, by the way), I felt like the only person in the world, intimate with the ice and the air and the stars shining down. I remember such a sense of fullness and completeness though I was all alone.... but not lonely at all, not with the company of nature's sensory presence to feel and see and smell and just to be a part of.²⁸

The appreciator here, Laurie Leahy, tells how her natural instincts guide her attention to those aspects of the natural environment that evoke in her a sense of fullness and completeness — the trees encircling the pond and the mysterious island. As the experience unfolds, her attention is then brought to other points of interest — the shining stars and the cold windy air — that are conducive to the emotional state that she is in the process of experiencing. Carroll traces the sequence as follows:

Our perceptual make-up initially focuses our attention on certain features of the natural expanse, which attention generates a state of emotional arousal, which state, in turn, issues in reinforcing feedback that consolidates the initial selective gestalt of the emotional arousal experience (*MBN*, 252).

We can see here that Carroll considers human nature equally as germane to the issue of nature appreciation as the natural environment appreciated. Recall also that Carlson himself points out that the proper way to conceive of the relationship between appreciator and appreciated in nature appreciation is as that between self and setting (*MBN*, 252).²⁹ Since the human (self) is part of the object of appreciation (the setting), her natural emotional responses are entirely legitimate in nature appreciation. Moreover, these natural responses are experienced and enjoyed, as Carroll puts it, "sans guidance by scientific categories," and without even common sense environmental and/or ecological knowledge (*MBN*, 245).

Finally, the arousal model does not falter as the landscape model does by reducing the natural environment to a scene or a view. The landscape model leads to both aesthetic omissions and aesthetic misapprehensions. By prioritizing the visual sensory stimuli provided by a natural environment, the landscape model leads us to miss much of the richness and texture the dynamic natural world has to offer. In addition, appreciation on the landscape model tends to overlook the very simple fact that the natural environment is an environment, one that consists of complex relationships and aspects in flux. The arousal model entails no such mistakes. On the arousal model, an appreciator is not limited to one or other sensory means to appreciation: she is open to the fullness offered by the natural environment.

There is an obvious sense in which being emotionally moved is necessarily and exclusively subjective. That is, the emotion occurs in the subject and in her alone. However, this is not the only notion of subjectivity, and is, in fact, not the sense that gives rise to the issue of epistemological relativity. All aesthetic experience, for that matter all experience, occurs in the subject and in her alone. Dismissing the objectivity of Carroll's arousal model because it depends on subjective emotional experience, therefore, will entail the dismissal of all aesthetic claims to objectivity. In fact, it seems tantamount to a wholesale rejection of objectivity per se.

One might, on the other hand, understand the notion of subjectivity as referring to an idiosyncratic response in the subject and, therefore, not one that is intersubjectively available. Although some experiences are subjective merely in the sense of "being in the subject" and are not idiosyncratic, one might argue that emotional experiences are subjective in both senses — "in the subject" and "idiosyncratic to her." However, emotional responses, contrary perhaps to popular belief, are not of this sort. Emotions have both a cognitive dimension (such as beliefs) and a cognitive function (such as the focusing of attention).³⁰

Carroll explains:

We can assess the appropriateness of the emotion of fear for an emoter in terms of whether or not she believes that the particular object of her emotion is dangerous. We can, furthermore, assess whether the appropriateness of her fears ought to be shared by others by asking whether the beliefs, thoughts or patterns of attention that underpin her emotions are the sorts of beliefs, thoughts or patterns of attention that it is reasonable for others to share (*MBN*, 258).

Emotions are directed at objects; for example, my fear might be aroused by a snake. Emotions depend on beliefs; I will only be afraid of the snake if I believe that snakes are dangerous. And emotions help us filter out irrelevant information and focus on what matters at the moment — that is, I care where the snake is and where it is going, not about the temperature or the birdsong in the background. This simple example allows us to see the inner workings of the arousal model and to grasp clearly the nature of its claim to objectivity. Whether any given emotional response is appropriate is a function of the object of the emotion and the subject's beliefs about that object. Whether aesthetic judgments based on such a response are objective is gleaned by considering the basis for the relevant belief(s). If the belief that snakes are dangerous is reasonable, then the claim that they are scary is objectively true. Moreover, many emotional responses are of the sort common to humanity per se. For instance, a natural and appropriate emotional response to the sight of intense human suffering is that of sympathy. Therefore, it seems that without any help from scientific knowledge an appreciator can appreciate nature by being emotionally aroused by it; moreover,

there are standards according to which such emotional arousals may be deemed appropriate and the judgments related to them, objective.

The Need for a Revisionist-Extensionist Model of Nature Appreciation

Currently, the debate over the propriety and independence of the arousal model continues between Carroll and Carlson. Carlson has argued that the arousal model is either a model of inappropriate nature appreciation or it reduces to the natural environment model.³¹ We have already seen how Carroll defends his claim to appropriateness: an emotional response is appropriate when the beliefs that underwrite it, together with the perceptual stimuli that evoke it, make the response reasonable. Furthermore, the cognitive dimension of emotions qualifies “being moved by nature” as a full-fledged case of appreciation since emotions play an important role in evaluation; emotions direct our attention by appraising the situation.

The other side of the debate concerns the question of whether appreciation on the arousal model makes use of common sense/scientific knowledge. If so, Carlson has grounds to claim the arousal model simply describes a special sort of appreciation that can be understood under the general rubric of the natural environment model. Carlson indeed argues that this is the case. The arousal model, he claims, is simply a specialized version of the natural environment model and, therefore, not a rival or supplementary model of nature appreciation. He explains:

the contrast between the arousal and natural environment model is less clear. If we recognize our scientific knowledge of the natural world as only a finer-grained and theoretically richer version of our common, everyday knowledge of it, and not as something essentially different in kind, then the difference between the arousal model and the natural environment model is mainly one of emphasis. Both models track the appreciation of nature, although the arousal model focuses on the more common, less cognitively rich, and perhaps less serious end of the continuum.³²

Leaving aside the issues of richness and seriousness, the debate hinges on Carlson’s conception of common sense/scientific knowledge. The construal of scientific knowledge as refined and advanced everyday knowledge about nature does not seem problematic to me. In fact, there is a sense in which the difference between all and any knowledge is simply one of degree. However, we must pay careful attention to details of the process of education taking place between everyday and scientific knowledge during their refinement and advancement.

This education must involve the eradication of false beliefs, clarification of vague concepts until they become precise, drawing distinctions where there previously were none, and an advancement in understanding of the

interrelations of forces and entities. In fact, if it does not, it is difficult to understand Carlson's claim that scientific knowledge is the key to the appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature. If, on the other hand, the beliefs we entertain before and during this transformation are sufficient to ground appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, Carlson is right that the difference between his model and the arousal model is far from clear.

Carlson can sidestep Carroll's criticism if he construes common sense to include such notions as the belief that this mountain is "composed of whatever geological stuff mountains are composed of."³³ However, doing so threatens to weaken his position to a point at which it is barely recognizable. For if this is the sort of knowledge necessary to appreciate nature appropriately, it seems that we hardly ever fail to do so correctly. Recall also that Carlson's model is intended to dispel the belief that nature appreciation is relative. If appreciation is appropriate regardless of whether it is informed by scientific knowledge or general knowledge and beliefs (whether true or false) about nature, it is difficult to grasp the importance of scientific knowledge in nature appreciation on the natural environment model.

Thus, Carlson is left with three choices. First, he might, as just discussed, construe common sense/scientific knowledge rather broadly, thus being able to accommodate Carroll's model as an instance of his own. Carlson does take this approach. In response to Carroll's contention that the arousal model is a legitimate mode of nature appreciation and therefore scientific knowledge is unnecessary for appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, Carlson restates his position. According to his restatement, "appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature requires knowledge about nature and that the relevant knowledge is paradigmatically provided by the natural sciences and by their commonsense predecessors and analogues."³⁴ However, if that is the case, then it is difficult to see what appreciation would count as inappropriate. After all, the inability of the object and landscape models to meet the requirement that nature be appreciated *as nature* was said to be due to a lack of a full understanding of the natural environment. If we are to count commonsense predecessors and analogues as knowledge adequate to inform appropriate nature appreciation on the natural environment model, Carlson must, at the very least, provide a way to discriminate between these and those beliefs that do not measure up. For if all do, then the appreciation Carlson describes seems unremarkable.

Second, Carlson might tighten the reigns and insist that the proper appreciation of nature necessarily includes somewhat specialized and precise knowledge of nature. Therefore, he can maintain that appreciation on the arousal model is inappropriate. Doing so, however, will drastically limit the scope of appropriate nature appreciation, for it is difficult to think of cases that will then count as appropriate nature appreciation — at least as far as natural environments go. The diversity of natural environments makes it

extremely unlikely that any appreciator will get everything right in the process of appreciation. Furthermore, if Carlson takes this route, he must then provide evidence and an argument that the arousal model (and perhaps others) sanctions inappropriate nature appreciation. The arguments he wages against the object and landscape models, as we have seen, do not accomplish this.

Finally, Carlson might admit that although his model does help us understand the appropriateness of one form of nature appreciation, it does not exhaust the possibilities of such appreciation. Given that Carroll's arousal model does not err by treating nature as if it were art, it succeeds where others fail. Therefore, without an argument to show the inappropriateness of nature appreciation on the arousal model, it remains a viable alternative to the natural environment model. This, I think, is Carlson's best option for several reasons. First, it allows Carlson to preserve the integrity of his model. He need not weaken his account to include commonsense beliefs. Furthermore, not only does Carroll's arousal model capture experiences with which we are familiar, it also illustrates the possibility of aesthetically appreciating an object with only very basic knowledge of it. This facet of Carroll's account, accords with the common pre-theoretical conviction regarding the role of knowledge and the possibility of appreciation by an uninformed appreciator. That is, we are inclined to deny that extensive knowledge and/or formal education are necessary for aesthetic appreciation. Carlson seems to acknowledge the possibility that a naïve appreciator can appreciate nature aesthetically, but he might both acknowledge this and claim that his model of nature appreciation does not admit of this possibility. In other words, the best option available to Carlson is to admit that his model is not *the only* model of appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature. He would thereby recognize the arousal model as legitimate and allow for the possibility that other — equally appropriate — models might be elucidated.

Carlson characterizes the difference between his and Carroll's model as one of emphasis. I agree, in spirit. As I have indicated, I do not think that Carlson's theory is best served by weakening his position to encompass Carroll's model. It seems to me that it is worth attempting to understand what Carlson's and Carroll's models share. Both of these models advance our understanding of nature appreciation and together they provide a more complete picture of nature appreciation. Carlson's and Carroll's models of nature appreciation approach the issue of appropriateness from different angles. Carlson's revisionist approach presents a model of nature appreciation with normative force: it seems that his goal, in large part, is to inform us how best to appreciate nature. Carroll's extensionist approach presents a model of nature appreciation with descriptive accuracy: it seems that his goal, in large part, is to help us understand the appropriateness of common

modes of nature appreciation. In sum, Carlson's model is instructive; Carroll's is empowering.

However, by emphasizing different aspects of nature appreciation — the more and less familiar — neither the revisionist nor the extensionist approach can suffice in isolation. The revisionist model alone is farsighted: telling us what we ought to do without taking into consideration what we already comfortably do is excessively pedantic. On the other hand, the extensionist approach alone is nearsighted: without an eye toward how to best enrich and encourage the appreciation of nature, the extensionist approach is unsatisfying. I propose that the best approach to a thorough understanding of nature appreciation is had by joining these two approaches together. What is most desirable is a revisionist-extensionist model of nature appreciation.³⁵

NOTES

1. See for example, Jerome Stolnitz, "The Aesthetic Attitude," from *Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 32-42; reprinted in *Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology*, 2d ed., ed. George Dickie, Richard Sclafani, and Ronald Roblin (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 334-41; *Appreciation of the Cow with the Subtle Nose* (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1984), 129-40; Yuriko Saito, "Everyday Aesthetics" *Philosophy and Literature* 25, no. 1 (2001): 87-93; and Thomas Leddy, "Everyday Surface Aesthetic Qualities: 'Neat,' 'Messy,' 'Clean,' 'Dirty,'" *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 53, no. 3 (1995): 259-69.
2. Allen Carlson, "Appreciation and the Natural Environment" *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 37, no. 3 (1979): 267-75; reprinted in Allen Carlson, *Aesthetics of the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art, and Architecture* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 41. This article will be cited as ANE in the text for all subsequent references.
3. Kendall Walton, "Categories of Art," *The Philosophical Review* 79 (1970): 334-67; reprinted in Dickie, Sclafani, and Roblin, *Aesthetics*, 394. This article will be cited as CA in the text for all subsequent references.
4. Moreover, the claim that we are familiar with the conventions of art appreciation finds support in the leading theories of art today, such as historical and institutional theories of art. For example, George Dickie, the leading proponent of the institutional theory, defines art (in its classificatory sense) as follows: X is a work of art if and only if it is "(1) an artifact (2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld)"; George Dickie, *Art and the Aesthetic, An Institutional Analysis* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 34. According to Dickie, as members of the artworld, which we are when we participate in the appreciation of art, we have the basic relevant background knowledge about how and what to appreciate in a given work of art. In short, as appreciators we are familiar with the conventions of the artworld. Moreover, the artifact condition can be met by instances of "found art" — readymades like Duchamp's *Fountain* — or natural objects like a piece of driftwood. For although readymades are artifacts that were not initially intended as artworks and natural objects are not artifacts, they can become artifacts in the relevant sense. Drawing on Arthur Danto's now familiar analysis of indiscernables in Arthur Danto, *Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), Dickie argues that such objects are converted into artworks when they are "picked up and displayed in the way that a painting or a sculpture

- is displayed." The object (a piece of driftwood or an ordinary urinal) thus is "used as an artistic medium and thereby would become part of the complex object — the-driftwood-used-as-an-artistic-medium"; George Dickie, "The New Institutional Theory of Art" in *Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology*, 199. See also Dickie's earlier discussion of this phenomenon in *Art and the Aesthetic*, especially pp. 44 ff.
5. This is true even given the fact that there remains very little (if any) of the natural world that has not been in some way affected by human beings. For not all of these effects are intentional, and moreover, very few of those that are intentional are intentionally made for aesthetic appreciation. For critical discussion of the dichotomy between the natural and human-affected world, and the issue of pristine nature, especially concerning pre-European North America, see William Denevan, "The Pristine Myth: The Landscape of the Americas in 1492," *Annals of the Association of Geographers* 82, no. 3 (1992): 369-85; Thomas Vale, "The Myth of the Humanizes Landscape: An Example from Yosemite National Park," *Natural Areas Journal* 18, no. 3 (1998): 231-36; and Donald Worster, "The Nature We Have Lost," in *The Wealth of Nature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 3-15.
 6. See, for example, Ronald Hepburn, "Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature," in *Aesthetics and the Modern World*, ed. Harold Osborne (London: Thames and Hudson, 1968), 49-66; Malcolm Budd, "The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 36, no. 3 (1996): 207-22; and Stan Godlovitch, "Evaluating Nature Aesthetically," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 56, no. 2 (1998): 113-25.
 7. Hepburn, "Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature," 53.
 8. Malcolm Budd, "The Aesthetics of Nature," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 100 (2000): 137.
 9. Walton does not speak in these terms. Where I speak of appropriate appreciation, Walton talks of true and false judgments of art. There is clearly a relation between the two, since one can only make a true judgment of a work if she appreciates it in the proper way, which requires seeing it as a member of the correct category. I do not think, therefore, that my terminology distorts Walton's view at all.
 10. Stan Godlovitch seriously entertains a similar analysis of our aesthetic appreciation of nature in "Evaluating Nature Aesthetically," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 56, no. 2 (1998): 113-25. In this essay, Godlovitch is primarily concerned with the making of public policy decisions regarding nature.
 11. This aspect of relativity in nature appreciation leads some philosophers to avoid the topic altogether. Hegel, for example, restricts his aesthetic inquiry to art because he thinks that nature and alleged natural beauty do not lend themselves to objective judgments. He explains that: "In dealing with natural beauty we find ourselves too open to *vagueness*, and too destitute of a *criterion*; for which reason such a review would have little interest"; G.W. Hegel, *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics*, trans. Bernard Bosanquet, ed. Michael Inwood (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 5. In a similar vein, George Santayana claims that since nature offers us an "indeterminate object," nature appreciation is highly subjective and not constrained by the same rules that art appreciation is: "The natural landscape is an indeterminate object; it almost always contains enough diversity to allow the eye a great liberty in selecting, emphasizing, and grouping its elements, and it is furthermore rich in suggestion and in vague emotional stimulus. A landscape to be seen has to be composed"; George Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty*, vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), 103.
 12. In fairness to Walton, I think it important to point out that his "Categories of Art" is an attempt to understand art appreciation. His comments regarding nature appreciation are terse and passing.
 13. Carlson, "Nature, Aesthetic Judgment, and Objectivity" in *Aesthetics and the Environment*, 58.

14. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste" in *David Hume's Selected Essays* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 137.
15. Carlson, "Nature, Aesthetic Judgment, and Objectivity," 64.
16. Ibid.
17. This is not to say that medical examiners and research scientists cannot appreciate nature appropriately. They can and perhaps can do so while performing an autopsy or a vivisection. It is only to deny that every case of their work involving perceiving natural entities under the proper categories is an instance of appropriate nature appreciation.
18. I am also not convinced that nonrepresentational works of art are self-contained aesthetic units. Carlson is right to point out that such works can be moved from museum to museum or displayed in a courtyard without losing their salient aesthetic features. However, this alone does not show that they are self-contained units that do not refer beyond themselves. Many such works make implicit or explicit reference to the artworld, its conventions and values. However, nothing much here hinges on this point of contention, so I shall leave it aside for now.
19. Walker Percy, "The Loss of the Creature" in *The Message in the Bottle: How Queer Man Is, How Queer Language Is, and What One Has to Do with the Other* (New York: The Noonday Press, 1995), 47.
20. Sharon Butala, *The Perfection of the Morning: An Apprenticeship in Nature* (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1995), 9, 12.
21. Francis Sparshott, "Figuring the Ground: Notes on Some Theoretical Problems of the Aesthetic Environment," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 6, no. 3 (1972): 11-23.
22. For a few examples, see: Yuriko Saito, "Is There a Correct Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature?" *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, 18, no. 4 (1984): 35-45; Matthew Kieren, "A Divine Intimation: Appreciating Natural Beauty," *Journal of Value Inquiry* 31 (1997): 77-95, esp. §4; Nick Zangwill, "Formal Natural Beauty," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 101 (2001): 209-24; and Thomas Heyd, "Aesthetic Appreciation and the Many Stories about Nature," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 41, no. 2 (2001): 125-37.
23. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief* compiled from notes taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees, and James Taylor, ed. Cyril Barrett (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 7.
24. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that an expert in any area is the most qualified to appreciate objects aesthetically in their area of expertise. Hunters are devout woodsmen, yet rarely do they stop to appreciate the natural beings aesthetically or natural environment. On the other hand, some artists are incapable of appreciating art unlike their own. Does it follow that such art is unappreciable? Clearly not.
25. Noël Carroll, "On Being Moved by Nature: Between Religion and Natural History," in *Landscape, Natural Beauty, and the Arts*, 244-66. This article will be cited as *MBN* in the text for all subsequent references. Carroll, "Emotion, Appreciation, and Nature," in *Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 384-94.
26. Stan Godlovitch argues against Carlson's model on these grounds in "Icebreakers: Environmentalism and Natural Aesthetics," *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 11, no. 1 (1994): 24, where Godlovitch argues that "any natural aesthetic has to respect the inarticulable which is, after all, the spontaneous voice of nature." However, according to Godlovitch, Carlson's natural environment model does not respect the mystery of nature and instead assimilates aesthetic appreciation of nature with the systematic analysis of it. I find Godlovitch's criticism of Carlson wanting for two reasons: First, I do not think that science is necessarily at odds with the "respect for the inarticulable," for any scientist worth her salt will admit that her knowledge of any natural phenomenon does not entirely exhaust the matter. Second, even if science is at odds with the sort of respect in question, I do not agree with Godlovitch that this undermines the claim that scientific

knowledge might yield some appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature. This is because I hesitate to accept Godlovitch's claim that nature appreciation must be a matter of apprehending the mystery of nature — I admit that it *can* be; but I do not see why it *must* be. There is however a practical issue that Godlovitch's analysis points toward, but that he does not pursue. It is the question of the nature of nature appreciation in a prescientific mind.

27. See Carlson's response to Carroll's objection in "Nature, Aesthetic Appreciation, and Knowledge" *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 53, no. 4 (1995): 393–400.
28. Personal correspondence with Laurie Leahy, an active member of Natureconnect, and a woman who graciously offered me this example when she learned of my project.
29. As Carroll says, "Carlson, like Sparshott, wants us to think of the appreciator of nature as a self in a setting which I understand as, in part, a warning not to divorce human nature from nature."
30. See also Noël Carroll, "Emotion, Appreciation, and Nature," 387–89. Carroll's defense of the potential objectivity of emotional responses should be somewhat familiar, for it shares important features with Hume's same defense; see Hume, "Of the Passions," in *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book 2, esp. part 1, section iii, ed. David and Mary Norton (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
31. Carlson, "Nature, Aesthetic Appreciation, and Knowledge," see also "The Aesthetics of Nature" in *Aesthetics and the Environment*.
32. Carlson, "The Aesthetics of Nature," 7.
33. Carroll, "Emotion, Appreciation, and Nature," 390.
34. Carlson, "Nature, Aesthetic Appreciation, and Knowledge," 394.
35. I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers of this journal for their feedback and suggestions, as well as Claudia Card, Noël Carroll, and Steve Nadler for their comments on previous versions of this essay.